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THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS IN 
BANK SUPERVISION IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Heidi Mandanis Schooner* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
uper regulators are the new wave in financial market 
regulation.  “Super,” or “integrated,” regulators are agen-
cies vested with primary supervisory responsibility for 
more than one of the three traditional financial sectors — bank-
ing, securities, and insurance.1  Many countries have revamped 
their regulatory systems to establish a single regulator for all 
three sectors.2  One of the most important examples of this 
trend is the United Kingdom (“U.K.”), which, pursuant to the 
Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 (“FSMA”),3 estab-
lished its Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) as an integrated 
supervisor in 2001.  Significantly, just prior to the creation of 
the FSA, the U.K. had transferred bank supervisory authority 
from the Bank of England to the Securities Investment Board, 
which later became the FSA.4  As a result, the U.K.’s current 
financial regulatory regime is integrated, but also separated 
from the central bank. 
Meanwhile, across the ocean, Congress awarded the central 
bank of the United States (“U.S.”) an expanded supervisory 
  
 * Associate Professor, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University 
of America.  I thank Professors Patricia McCoy, Steven Schooner, and Dr. 
Michael Taylor for their valuable contributions and Ed Loughlin for his dili-
gent and able research assistance.  I also thank the participants at Brooklyn 
Law School’s symposium, Do Financial Supermarkets Need Super Regulators? 
 1. In this Article, the concept of “integration” is used in a broad sense. It 
can also be viewed more narrowly.  For example, an informal group of inte-
grated regulators (including regulators from Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Iceland, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, and the U.K.) define the term 
“integrated regulation” to encompass any agency responsible for prudential 
regulation of both banks and insurance companies.  See Jeffrey Carmichael, 
Experiences with Integrated Regulation, 6 FI N. REGULATOR 57, n. 2 (2001). 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8 (Eng.). 
 4. See infra Part III.B. 
S 
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role.  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (“GLBA”)5 estab-
lished the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(“Federal Reserve”) as umbrella regulator for financial holding 
companies — newly created entities that promise to become the 
U.S. version of the financial supermarket.6  The umbrella 
scheme rejects the integrated supervisory model and retains a 
hybrid of both functional and institutional regulation7 — the 
hallmark of the balkanized system of financial regulation in the 
U.S. 
At least on the surface, the U.K. and U.S. adopted opposite 
approaches to the oft-debated questions of whether single-
agency integrated supervision is necessary to effective financial 
regulation and whether central banks must be directly involved 
in bank supervision.  While this Article focuses on the question 
of the role of central banks in bank supervision, given the trend 
toward integrated supervision, the question of single-agency 
supervision will touch upon the analysis of the central bank’s 
role as well. 
Part II provides context for the discussion by describing the 
current status of central banks as supervisors around the world, 
first examining the role of the new European Central Bank and 
then surveying the role of the central banks in all Organisation 
for Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) countries.8  Part 
III considers the supervisory roles of the Bank of England and 
the Federal Reserve following the passage of the FSMA and 
GLBA, respectively.  Part IV synthesizes the current debate, 
both theoretical and empirical , on whether the implementation 
of monetary policy and bank supervision should be separated.  
In light of the pros and cons set forth in Part IV, Part V evalu-
ates the current status of the Bank of England and the Federal 
  
 5. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). 
 6. See infra Part III.A. 
 7. For a full discussion of the hybrid model of functional and institutional 
regulation, see Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Functional Regulation: The Securi-
tization of Banking Law, in  FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION AFTER GRAMM-LEACH-
BLILEY 189 (Patricia A. McCoy ed., 2002). 
 8. Comprised of thirty member countries, the OECD is “an international 
organisation helping governments tackle the economic, social and governance 
challenges of a globalised economy.”  OECD, at http://www.oecd.org (last vis-
ited Jan. 23, 2003). 
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Reserve.  Part VI concludes by offering certain recommenda-
tions for reform and making predictions for the future. 
II. CENTRAL BANKS AS BANK SUPERVISORS 
Central banks have a long history.9  Therefore, the question 
of whether a nation’s central bank should or should not be 
tasked with bank supervision is normally complicated by long-
standing traditions and relationships.  Contrast this with the 
European Central Bank (“ECB”).10  The establishment of the 
ECB generated lively discussion regarding the role of central 
banks as supervisors.11  Thus, the ECB’s supervisory role pro-
  
 9. For example, the Federal Reserve System was established in 1913 — a 
mere babe compared with the Bank of England, which was founded in 1694.   
 10. See European Central Bank, at http://www.ecb.int (last visited Jan. 23, 
2003).  For a comprehensive discussion of legal issues relating to the ECB, see 
CHIARA ZILIOLI & MARTIN SELMAYR, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
(2001). 
 11. See, e.g., Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, Should Banking Su-
pervision and Monetary Policy Tasks Be Given to Different Agencies?, 2 INT ’L 
FIN. 361 (1999); Dr. Willem F. Duisenberg, The Future of Banking Supervi-
sion and the Integration of Financial Markets, Speech Presented to the Euro 
Group (May 22, 2000), available at  http://www.ecb.int/key/00/sp000522.htm; 
Charles M. Kahn & João A. C. Santos, Allocating Lending of Last Resort and 
Supervision in the Euro Area, SSRN ELECTRONIC LIBRARY (Apr. 2002), at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=310542 (last visited Mar. 
31, 2003); Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, EMU and Banking Supervision, Lecture 
at the London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group (Feb. 24, 1999), 
available at http://www.ecb.int/key/sp990224.htm.   
  The ECB also issued the following press release on its position in the 
debate: 
The recent debate on the reorganisation of the supervisory structures 
in some euro area countries has led the Governing Council of the 
ECB to assess the involvement of central banks in prudential super-
vision. 
  The Governing Council is firmly convinced that there are valid 
reasons, also in relation to the effects of the introduction of the euro, 
arguing in favor of maintaining a strong involvement of central banks 
in prudential supervision. 
Press Release, European Central Bank, The Role of Central Banks in Pruden-
tial Supervision (Mar. 22, 2001), available at http://www.ecb.int/press/01/ 
pr010322.htm.  Of course, this position is not surprising given the fact that 
the Governing Council’s membership is dominated by the governors of mem-
ber states’ central banks. 
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vides a backdrop for broader consideration of the role of central 
banks internationally.    
The Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC 
Treaty”)12 established the ECB as the central bank for the coun-
tries that adopted the euro.13  The European System of Central 
Banks (“ESCB”) is comprised of the ECB and the central banks 
of member states.14  The ESCB’s primary objective is the main-
tenance of price stability.15  The ECB does not act as a pruden-
tial supervisor.16  Rather, the EC Treaty provides that the 
ESCB shall “contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pur-
sued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the finan-
cial system.”17  Consistent with the treaty provisions, the ECB’s 
statute (annexed to the EC Treaty) provides: 
The ECB may offer advice to and be consulted by the Council, 
the Commission and the competent authorities of the Member 
States on the scope and implementation of Community legisla-
tion relating to the prudential supervision of credit institu-
tions and to the stability of the financial system.18 
Nonetheless, the statute does contemplate a potential, albeit 
limited, supervisory role for the ECB even in the absence of an 
amendment to the EC Treaty: 
In accordance with any decision of the Council under Article 
105(6) (ex Article 105(6)) of this Treaty, the ECB may perform 
specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential 
  
 12. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. 
(C 340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. 
 13. Twelve European Union member states have adopted the euro: Bel-
gium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, and Finland.  Member states not participat-
ing in the euro are: Denmark, Sweden, and the U.K..  For information on the 
U.K.’s position with regard to any future adoption of the euro, see HM Treas-
ury, The Government’s Policy on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/the_euro/euro_index_index.cfm 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2003).  
 14. EC TREATY art. 106(1) (ex art. 105a). 
 15. Id. art. 105(1). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. art. 105(5). 
 18. PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS 
AND OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, art. 25.1, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 73 
(1992). 
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supervision of credit institutions and other financial institu-
tions with the exception of insurance undertakings.19 
In euro area Europe, therefore, prudential supervision re-
mains a matter of national responsibility.20  That responsibility 
may be held by a national central bank, which, however, no 
longer conducts monetary policy.   
Even in situations in which a central bank is not the pruden-
tial supervisor, (e.g., the ECB), a central bank cannot remain 
divorced entirely from the supervisory process, particularly dur-
ing a financial crisis.  Moreover, even when central banks are 
not the primary supervisor, central banks’ supervisory role may 
vary to a large degree.  For example, the central bank may re-
tain the power to conduct back-up examinations21 or it may not.  
Moreover, the central bank’s role (when it is not the primary 
supervisor) is likely to be strongly influenced by the general 
reputation and stature of the central bank and its governors, as 
much as by its positive legal authority.  As Carmine Di Noia 
and Giorgio Di Giorgio observe: 
In some countries, an agency in charge of banking supervision 
could be formally separated from the central bank but acting 
very closely to it.  Such an agency could, in reality, turn out to 
be strongly dependent on the central bank, even more depen d-
ent than a banking supervision department located inside the 
central bank in another country.22 
Given these qualifications, Figure 1 provides some quantita-
tive data on the supervisory role of central banks in general.23  
Figure 1 illustrates the seat of primary bank supervision in the 
OECD countries.  The term “primary bank supervision”24 is 
  
 19. Id. art. 25.2. 
 20. Of course, this issue is by no means closed off to debate; many propos-
als have been made that would alter the current scheme of supervisory re-
sponsibility.  See Jeroen Kremers et al., Does Europe Need a Euro-wide Su-
pervisor?, 6 FI N. REGULATOR  50 (2001). 
 21. The Federal Reserve retains such power.  See infra Part III.A. 
 22. Di Noia & Di Giorgio, supra note 11, at 364 n.5. 
 23. Other studies have used slightly different dividing lines.  For example, 
Di Noia and Di Giorgio examined whether the central banks had monopolist 
control over bank supervision in the then 25 OECD countries.  See id. at 366 
(table 1). 
 24. In this Article, this concept of “primary” bank supervisor is derived 
from U.S. law, under which various supervisory and regulatory provisions are 
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used here to refer to the agency that conducts regular bank ex-
aminations.  In Figure 1, central banks with such responsibility 
are noted in bold. 
Figure 1 is constructed to identify which central banks are 
primary bank supervisors rather than which central banks 
have a role in bank supervision.  Few would debate the need for 
a central bank to be involved — at some level — in bank super-
vision.  This will remain true as long as: (1) banks remain im-
portant to the overall economy; (2) central banks are responsi-
ble for the payment system; and (3) central banks are the lend-
  
the responsibility of the “appropriate federal banking agency.”  Federal Bank-
ing law defines the term “appropriate Federal banking agency” to mean: 
(1) the Comptroller of the Currency, in the case of any national bank-
ing association, any District bank, or any Federal branch or agency of 
a foreign bank;  
(2) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, in the case 
of — 
(A) any State member insured bank (except a District bank),  
(B) any branch or agency of a foreign bank with respect to any 
provision of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 221 et seq., 
which is made applicable under the International Banking Act of 
1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq., 
(C) any foreign bank which does not operate an insured branch, 
(D) any agency or commercial lending company other than a 
Federal agency,  
(E) supervisory or regulatory proceedings arising from the au-
thority given to the Board of Governors under section 7(c)(1) of 
the International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3105 (c)(1), 
including such proceedings under the Financial Institutions Su-
pervisory Act of 1966, and  
(F) any bank holding company and any subsidiary of a bank hold-
ing company (other than a bank);  
(3) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the case of a State 
nonmember insured bank (except a District bank), or a foreign bank 
having an insured branch; and 
(4) the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision in the case of any 
savings association or any savings and loan holding company.  Under 
the rule set forth in this subsection, more than one agency may be an 
appropriate Federal banking agency with respect to any given insti-
tution.  
12 U.S.C. § 1813(q) (2000).  
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ers of last resort.  The true debate centers on two queries: (1) 
Should the central bank be the or one of the primary bank su-
pervisors? (2) If the central bank is not a primary regulator, 
what then is its appropriate non-primary role?  Figure 1 further 
notes whether the primary bank supervisor is also an inte-
grated supervisor.  
 
Figure 1: OECD Countries: Agency with Primary Bank Su-
pervisory Authority 
 
Country Primary Bank Supervi-
sory Authority 
Notes and Refer-
ences 
Australia Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority 
The APRA is    
responsible for 
prudential regula-
tion of banks and 
insurance compa-
nies. 
http://www.apra. 
gov.au.   
Austria Finanzmarktaufsicht 
(Austrian Financial 
Market Authority) 
The FMA was  
established on 
April 1, 2002 as an 
integrated finan-
cial supervisor. 
http://www.fma.gv
.at 
Belgium Commission Bancaire 
et Financière  
(Banking and Finance 
Commission) 
http://www.cbf.be/
mov.htm  
Canada Office of the              
Superintendent of    
Financial Institutions 
http://www.osfi-
bsif.gc.ca/eng/  
default.asp  
Czech  
Republic 
Ceska narodni banka 
(Czech National Bank) 
http://www.cnb.cz/
en/index.php 
File: SCHOONER Base Macro2.doc Created on:  3/31/2003 11:33 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:32 AM 
418 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:2 
Denmark Finanstilsynet (Danish 
Financial Supervisory 
Authority) 
The FSA is an in-
tegrated financial 
supervisor organ-
ized under the 
Minister for Eco-
nomic Affairs. 
http://www.ftnet. 
dk  
Finland Rahoitustarkastus (Fi-
nancial Supervision 
Authority) 
The FSA was es-
tablished in 1993 
as an integrated 
financial supervi-
sor. Furthermore, 
the FSA “operates 
in connection with 
the Bank of 
Finland but is an 
independent deci-
sion-making 
body.” 
http://www.raha.b
of.fi/english/index.
asp 
France La Commission Ban-
caire (The Banking 
Commission) 
While the Banking 
Commission con-
ducts bank exami-
nations, the Ban-
que de France pro-
vides the Commis-
sion with some 
staff and re-
sources.  http: 
//www.banque-
france.fr/gb/baque/
main.htm 
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Germany Bundesanstalt für Fi-
nanzdienstleistung-
saufsicht (“BAFin”)  
(German Financial Su-
pervisory Authority) 
BAFin was estab-
lished on May 1, 
2002 as an inte-
grated financial 
supervisor. 
http://www.bafin.d
e/english/index_e.
htm 
Greece ???pe?a t?? ????d?? 
(Bank of Greece) 
http://www.bankof
greece.gr/en/  
Hungary Zügyi Szervezetek Ál-
lami Felügyelete 
(Hungarian Financial 
Supervisory Authority) 
The FSA was es-
tablished in April 
2000 as an inte-
grated financial 
supervisor. 
http://www.pszaf.h
u/english/start.ht
ml 
 
Iceland Fjármálaeftirlitið     
(Financial Supervisory 
Authority) 
The FME was es-
tablished in 1998 
as an integrated 
financial supervi-
sor. 
http://www.fme.is/
fme.nsf/pages/inde
x.html 
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Ireland Banc Ceannais na 
Héireann (Central 
Bank of Ireland) 
The Bank is an 
integrated finan-
cial supervisor.  
“The Bank is 
statutorily respon-
sible for the su-
pervision of most 
financial institu-
tions in Ireland 
including banks, 
building societies 
and a broad range 
of non-bank firms, 
exchanges and 
collective invest-
ment schemes.”  
See http://www. 
centrabank.ie/ 
mainpage.asp  
Italy Banca d’Italia (Bank 
of Italy) 
http://www.bancad
italia.it 
Japan Financial Services 
Agency 
The FSA was 
established in 
1998 as an inte-
grated financial 
supervisor. 
http://www.fsa.go.j
p/indexe.html 
Korea Financial Supervisory 
Commission 
The FSC was es-
tablished on April 
1, 1998 as an inte-
grated financial 
supervisor. 
http://www.fsc.go.
kr/eng/about/index
.htm   
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Luxembourg Commission de Surveil-
lance du Secteur Finan-
cier (“CSSF”) 
CSSF is an inte-
grated supervisor 
(banking and se-
curities). 
http://www.cssf.lu   
Mexico Comision Nacional 
Bancaria y de Valores 
(National Banking and 
Securities Commission) 
CNBV is an inte-
grated supervisor 
(banking and se-
curities). 
http://www.cnbv. 
gob.mx 
Netherlands De Nederlandsche 
Bank (Nederlandsche 
Bank) 
http://www.dnb.nl/
english/index.htm  
New  
Zealand 
Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand 
http://www.rbnz.g
ovt.nz/baning/supe
rvision/index.html   
Norway Kredittilsynet Kredittilsynet is 
an integrated fi-
nancial supervi-
sor. 
http://www.kreditt
isynet.no   
Poland Nadzór Bankowy 
(Commission for Bank-
ing Supervision).   
It has strong ties 
to the National 
Bank of Poland 
(“NBP”).  For ex-
ample, the Com-
mission’s Chair-
person is the 
president of the 
NBP.)  
http://www.nbp.pl/
en/onbp/index. 
html (see “banking 
supervision” for a 
description of the 
Commission)  
Portugal Banco de Portugal 
(Bank of Portugal) 
http://www.bportu
gal.pt/default_e. 
htm  
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Slovak  
Republic 
Narodna banka slov-
enska (National Bank 
of Slovakia) 
http://www.nbs.sk/
INDEXA.HTM  
Spain Banco de España 
(Bank of Spain) 
http://www.bde.es/
homee.htm  
Sweden Finaansinspektionen 
(Swedish Financial Su-
pervisory Authority) 
 
Finannsinspek-
tionen is an inte-
grated financial 
supervisor. 
http://www.fi.se/en
glish/index.asp 
Switzerland Eidgenössische 
Bankenkommission 
(Swiss Federal Banking 
Commission) 
http://www.sfbc.ad
min.ch/  
Turkey Hazine Müstesarligi 
(Turkish Treasury) 
http://www.treasu
ry.gov.tr/indexe. 
htm  
United 
Kingdom 
Financial Services Au-
thority 
The FSA was es-
tablished on 
December 1, 2001 
as an integrated 
financial supervi-
sor. 
http://www.fsa.gov
.uk/ 
United 
States 
 
Federal Reserve , Of-
fice of the Comptroller 
of the Curency (“OCC”), 
Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation 
(“FDIC”), State Agen-
cies 
http://www.federal
reserve.gov/ 
default.htm (Fed); 
http://www.occ.tre
as.gov/index.htm 
(OCC); http:// 
www.fdic.gov/ 
(FDIC); 
http://www.csbs.or
g/links/state_links.
asp (state banking 
agencies) 
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In one-third of OECD countries, the central banks possess 
primary responsibility for bank supervision.  The percentage 
can also be stated differently.  In France, Poland, and Finland, 
the supervisory agencies are separate, but still have strong ties 
to the central bank.25  If France, Poland, and Finland are in-
cluded as countries whose central banks are primary bank su-
pervisors, then 43% of OECD countries task their central banks 
with primary bank supervision. 
Figure 1 also displays a significant recent phenomenon.  Thir-
teen of the thirty OECD countries have integrated financial 
supervisory authorities, almost all of which were rather re-
cently established.  Most noteworthy in the context of the role of 
central banks is that only one of the integrated financial 
supervisors is a central bank (Central Bank of Ireland).  
Against this backdrop, Part III compares the supervisory roles 
of the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve following 
recent legislative initiatives. 
III. THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK IN BANK SUPERVISION 
UNDER THE FSMA AND GLBA 
Many OECD countries have enacted legislation that alters 
the regulatory responsibilities of existing financial regulators or 
creates new agencies.  It is particularly interesting to study the 
recent approaches of the U.S. and U.K. given the very different 
results achieved in terms of the role to be played by the central 
bank.  This Part describes the roles envisioned for the Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of England following the passage of the 
GLBA and FSMA, respectively. 
A. The Federal Reserve 
Prior to the passage of the GLBA, the Federal Reserve was 
the primary regulator for state member banks and for bank 
holding companies.26  Under the GLBA, the Federal Reserve 
retains these responsibilities and is also the primary regulator 
for the new financial holding companies,27 which are also bank 
  
 25. See supra Figure 1. 
 26. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 12 U.S.C. § 221 (2000). 
 27. Financial holding companies are the vehicle for expanded activities 
permitted under the GLBA.  See generally Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Mi-
chael Taylor, United Kingdom and United States Responses to the Regulatory 
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holding companies.  The Federal Reserve’s role as primary 
regulator for state member banks gives it hands-on responsibil-
ity for only a small percentage of deposit institutions.28  Con-
versely, the Federal Reserve’s authority over bank holding com-
panies gives it, at least, indirect access to most banks and cer-
tainly the most important ones.   Bank holding companies con-
tinue to control the vast majority of U.S. bank assets.  In 2001, 
6,318 bank holding companies operated in the U.S. and con-
trolled 6,420 insured commercial banks.29  Commercial banks 
controlled by bank holding companies held 94.2% of all insured 
commercial bank assets.30  
Because of the restrictions the GLBA places on the activities 
of bank subsidiaries,31 the Federal Reserve retained a meaning-
ful role in supervision as the primary regulator of bank holding 
companies (including financial holding companies).32  Nonethe-
less, Congress demonstrated a clear preference for direct regu-
lation by the functional regulators rather than the Federal Re-
serve.  For example, the GLBA provides that the Federal Re-
serve may require reports33 from bank holding companies and 
their subsidiaries, but that “the Board shall, to the fullest ex-
tent possible, accept” reports that the bank holding company or 
  
Challenges of Modern Financial Markets, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 317 (2003) [here-
inafter Schooner & Taylor, U.K. and U.S. Responses]. 
 28. In 2001, the Federal Reserve Banks examined 534 of the 970 state 
member banks.  State member banks accounted for 12.1% of all insured com-
mercial banks and held 25.9% of all U.S. commercial bank assets.  BOARD OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, EIGHTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 143 (2001), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ 
rptcongress/annual01/ar01.pdf [hereinafter 2001 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE]. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.  
 31. See Schooner & Taylor, U.K. and U.S. Responses , supra note 27, at 325. 
 32. In the absence of significant restrictions on the activities of bank sub-
sidiaries, banking firms could choose to forego the bank holding company 
structure and thereby avoid Federal Reserve supervision entirely. 
 33. Such required report must relate to “(i) [the bank holding company’s or 
subsidiary’s] financial condition, systems for monitoring and controlling fi-
nancial and operating risks, and transactions with depository institution sub-
sidiaries of the bank holding company; and (ii) compliance by the company or 
subsidiary with applicable provisions of [the GLBA] or any other Federal law 
that the Federal Reserve has specific jurisdiction to enforce against such com-
pany or subsidiary.”  12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(1)(A) (2000). 
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subsidiary has provided to other state or federal regulators.34  
Moreover, in a case in which the Federal Reserve requests a 
report from a functionally regulated subsidiary35 of a bank hold-
ing company that is not already required by another federal or 
state regulator, the Federal Reserve “shall first request that the 
appropriate regulatory authority or self-regulatory organization 
obtain such report.”36 
Similarly, the GLBA vests the Federal Reserve with author-
ity to examine bank holding companies and their subsidiaries.  
Yet the Federal Reserve may examine a functionally regulated 
subsidiary of a bank holding company only if: 
  
 34. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(1)(B)(i)(I) (2000). 
 35. A functionally regulated subsidiary is: 
any company —  
(A) that is not a bank holding company or a depository institu-
tion; and  
(B) that is —  
(i) a broker or dealer that is registered under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934;  
(ii) a registered investment adviser, properly registered by or 
on behalf of either the Securities and Exchange Commission 
or any State, with respect to the investment advisory activi-
ties of such investment adviser and activities incidental to 
such investment advisory activities;  
(iii) an investment company that is registered under the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940;  
(iv) an insurance company, with respect to insurance activi-
ties of the insurance company and activities incidental to 
such insurance activities, that is subject to supervision by a 
State insurance regulator; or  
(v) an entity that is subject to regulation by the Commodities 
Futures Trading Commission, with respect to the commodi-
ties activities of such entity and activities incidental to such 
commodities activities. 
12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(5) (2000). 
 36. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(1)(B)(iii)(I) (2000).  If the Federal Reserve does not 
receive such a report and the report is “necessary to assess a material risk to 
the bank holding company or any of its depository institution subsidiaries” 
then the Federal Reserve may require the report from the functionally regu-
lated subsidiary.  12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(1)(B)(iii)(II) (2000). 
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(i) the Board has reasonable cause to believe that such sub-
sidiary is engaged in activities that pose a material risk to an 
affiliated depository institution,  
(ii) the Board reasonably determines, after reviewing relevant 
reports, that examination of the subsidiary is necessary to 
adequately inform the Board of [the systems for monitoring 
and controlling financial and operational risks], or  
(iii) based on reports and other available information, the 
Board has reasonable cause to believe that a subsidiary is not 
in compliance with this Act or any other Federal law that the 
Board has specific jurisdiction to enforce against such subsidi-
ary . . . and the Board cannot make such determination 
through examination of the affiliated depository institution or 
bank holding company.37 
Therefore, following the passage of the GLBA, the Federal Re-
serve ceased annual examination of subsidiaries conducting 
securities activities (formerly known as “Section 20 subsidiar-
ies”).38  Even with regard to the Federal Reserve’s examination 
of depository institutions, the GLBA instructs the Federal Re-
serve to defer “to the fullest extent possible” to the appropriate 
federal or state banking regulator.39 
The Federal Reserve has limited authority to set capital 
standards for bank holding company subsidiaries that are not 
depository institutions.40  Furthermore, unless the Federal Re-
serve possesses specific jurisdiction to do so, the Federal Re-
serve may not prescribe regulations or impose administrative 
restrictions on any functionally regulated subsidiary unless: 
(1) the action is necessary to prevent or redress an unsafe or 
unsound practice or breach of fiduciary duty by such subsidi-
ary that poses a material risk to –  
(A) the financial safety, soundness, or stability of an affili-
ated depository institution; or  
(B) the domestic or internation al payment system; and  
  
 37. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(B) (2000).  The Federal Reserve conducted no 
special examinations of this kind in 2001.  See 2001  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE, supra note 28, at 146. 
 38. 2001 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, supra note 28, at 145. 
 39. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(D) (2000). 
 40. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(3) (2000). 
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(2) the Board finds that it is not reasonably possible to protect 
effectively against the material risk at issue through action di-
rected at or against the affiliated depository institution or 
against depository institutions generally.41 
Consistent with the framework envisioned by Congress, the 
Federal Reserve describes its supervisory role with regard to 
financial holding companies (“FHCs”) as distinct from supervi-
sion over traditional banking holding companies (“BHCs”): 
The Federal Reserve’s supervisory oversight role is that of an 
umbrella supervisor concentrating on a consolidated or group-
wide analysis of an organization.  Umbrella supervision is not 
viewed as an extension of more traditional bank-like supervi-
sion throughout an FHC.  The FHC framework [of supervi-
sion] is consistent with and incorporates principles that are 
well established for BHCs.42 
While the Federal Reserve’s role as umbrella supervisor is 
not intended to duplicate the role of the banking agencies, its 
regulatory role remains focused on safety and soundness and 
not on other goals of financial regulation, such as consumer pro-
tection.  In describing the objectives of financial holding com-
pany supervision, the Federal Reserve states: 
The Federal Reserve, as umbrella supervisor, will seek to de-
termine that FHCs are operated in a safe and sound manner 
so that their financial condition does not threaten the viability 
of affiliated depository institutions.  Oversight of FHCs 
(particularly those engaged in a broad range of financial 
activities) at the consolidated level is important because the 
risks associated with those activities can cut across legal 
entities and business lines.  The purpose of FHC supervision is 
to identify and evaluate, on a consolidated or group-wide 
basis, the significant risks that exist in a diversified holding 
company in order to assess how these risks might affect the 
safety and soundness of depository institution subsidiaries.43 
  
 41. 12 U.S.C. § 1848a (2000). 
 42. Framework for Financial Holding Company Supervision, Letter from 
the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, to the Officer in Charge of Supervision and Ap-
propriate Supervisory Staff at Each Federal Reserve Bank and to Financial 
Holding Companies (Aug. 15, 2000), available at http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/boarddocs/SRLETTERS/2000/SR0013.htm. 
 43. Id. 
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B. Bank of England 
Pursuant to the Bank of England Act of 1998, responsibility 
for regulating depository institutions was transferred from the 
Bank of England (“the Bank”) to the Securities and Investments 
Board (later, the FSA).44  Under the FSMA, the FSA was estab-
lished as regulator for banking, securities, and insurance firms.  
Despite the divorce of the Bank from the formal supervision of 
banks, there is little doubt that this institution will continue to 
play an important role in bank supervision. 
The Bank has three core purposes,45 two of which have strong 
ties to bank supervision.  First, the Bank is charged with “main-
taining the integrity and value of the currency.”46  Second, the 
Bank must promote the stability of the financial system.47  
Third, the Bank must promote the effectiveness of the financial 
system.48  The second core purpose relates directly to bank su-
pervision and, according to the Bank, translates into three main 
areas of work: 
1/ analysing, and promoting initiatives to strengthen, the fi-
nancial system’s capacity to withstand shocks;  
2/ surveillance, that is monitoring developments in the finan-
cial system to try to identify potential threats to financial sta-
bility at an early stage; and  
3/ reinforcing arrangements for handling financial crises 
should they occur.49 
Further recognition of the Bank’s role in supervision is found 
in the Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, 
the Bank of England, and the FSA (“MoU”), which provides that 
“[t]he Bank will be responsible for the overall stability of the 
  
 44. Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, Convergence and Competi-
tion: The Case of Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States, 20 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 595, 646–47 (1999) [hereinafter Schooner & Taylor, Convergence 
and Competition]. 
 45. BANK OF ENGLAND, BANK OF ENGLAND 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (2002), 
available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/annualreport/2002report.pdf 
[hereinafter BANK OF ENGLAND 2002 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
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financial system as a whole . . . .”50  Apart from its specific 
monetary policy and payments systems responsibilities, the 
Bank is responsible for the: 
broad overview of the system as a whole. The Bank will be 
uniquely placed to do this: it will be responsible for monetary 
stability, and will have high level representation at the insti-
tution responsible for financial regulation (through the Deputy 
Governor (financial stability), who will be a member of the Fi-
nancial Services Authority Board). Through its involvement in 
the payments systems it may be the first to spot potential 
problems. The Bank will be able to advise on the implications 
for financial stability of developments in the domestic and in-
ternational markets and payments systems; and it will assess 
the impact on monetary conditions of events in the financial 
sector . . . .51 
Further, the MoU contemplates “official financial operations” 
by the Bank in exceptional circumstances to prevent systemic 
breakdown.52  Finally, the Bank is charged with “the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the financial sector, with particular regard 
to international competitiveness.”53  Many of these responsibili-
ties will dovetail with bank supervision.  One specific recent 
example of the Bank’s continued involvement in bank regula-
tion is the Bank’s representation, along with the FSA, of the 
U.K. in negotiations regarding the new Basel Capital Accord.54 
IV. SHOULD CENTRAL BANKS SUPERVISE? 
Driven in part by the question of bank supervision in euro-
area countries,55 a growing body of literature addresses whether 
central banking and bank supervision should be combined.56  
  
 50. Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of 
England and the FSA ¶ 2 (Oct. 28, 1997), available at http://www.bankof 
england.co.uk/legislation/mou.pdf. 
 51. Id. ¶ 2(iii). 
 52. Id. ¶ 2(iv). 
 53. Id. ¶ 2(v). 
 54. BANK OF ENGLAND 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 22. 
 55. See supra Part II. 
 56. See, e.g., Di Noia & Di Giorgio, supra note 11; Charles Goodhart & Dirk 
Schoenmaker, Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervi-
sion Be Separated?, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 539 (1995) [hereinafter Good-
hart & Schoenmaker, Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision]; Charles 
Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, Institutional Separation Between Supervisory 
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This Part summarizes both theoretical and empirical argu-
ments for and against the separation of central banking and 
bank supervision.  These arguments are presented in three 
categories:  (1) the combination of macroeconomic and micro-
economic goals; (2) the concentration of power; and (3) inde-
pendence and other institutional considerations. 
A. Combination of Macroeconomic and Microeconomic Goals 
Reluctance to task central bankers with bank supervision 
most often focuses on the ways in which the macroeconomic 
goals (price stability)57 and microeconomic goals (safety and 
soundness) can conflict.   A central bank may be more willing to 
lend to banks it supervises and this may conflict with monetary 
policy goals.58  Moreover, the central bank might be tempted to 
manipulate policy instruments, e.g., interest rates, to benefit 
  
and Monetary Agencies, 51 GIORNALE DEGLI ECONOMISTI E ANNALI DI ECONOMIA 
353 (1993) [hereinafter Goodhart & Schoenmaker, Institutional Separation]; 
Joseph G. Haubrich, Combining Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy, 
ECON . COMMENT. SERIES (Nov. 1996), at http://www.clev.frb.org/ 
research/com/1196.htm; H. Robert Heller, Prudential Supervision and Mone-
tary Policy, in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS 57 (Patrick Downes & 
Reza Vaez-Zadeh eds., 1991); EDUARDO LUNDBERG, MONETARY POLICY AND 
BANKING SUPERVISION FUNCTIONS ON THE CENTRAL BANK (Banco Central Do 
Brasil, Working Paper Series 2, 2002), at http://www.bcb.gov.br/ingles/public/ 
wps/wps02.pdf; Joe Peek et al., Is Bank Supervision Central to Central Bank-
ing?, 114 Q. J. ECON. 629 (1999); José Tuya & Lorena Zamalloa, Issues on 
Placing Banking Supervision in the Central Bank, in FRAMEWORKS FOR 
MONETARY STABILITY: POLICY ISSUES AND COUNTRY EXPERIENCES 663 (Tomás 
J.T. Baliño & Carlo Cottarelli eds., 1994). 
 57. The term “price stability” is used here as a generalized label for the 
monetary policy goal of central banks.  Of course, the specific goals of individ-
ual central banks may vary.  The Federal Reserve’s statutory mandate with 
regard to monetary policy is as follows: 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the 
monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's 
long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively 
the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-
term interest rates.  
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2000). 
 58. The significance of this conflict is questionable given the central bank’s 
ability to off-set the effect of lending to an individual bank through its open 
market operations.  See Goodhart & Schoenmaker, Institutional Separation, 
supra note 56, at 361. 
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banks under its supervision.59  This line of reasoning draws on a 
regulatory capture premise, i.e., that the central bank will ig-
nore its monetary objectives in favor of furthering the interests 
of its regulated constituents.60 
Similar to the conflict-oriented analysis is the preference for a 
single purpose. The principle is that a central bank performs 
better when it is focused on a single goal (i.e., price stability) as 
opposed to two (i.e., price stability and safety and soundness).  
In support of these arguments, Carmine Di Noia and Giorgio Di 
Giorgio found that central banks achieve better price stability 
when they are not required to juggle price stability with sole 
responsibility for bank supervision.61 
The conflict of interest arguments may underestimate the 
trade-offs faced by central banks.  As a practical matter, central 
banks can face multiple, and sometimes conflicting, macroeco-
nomic objectives.  For example, the Federal Reserve, by statute, 
is bound by the goals of “maximum employment, stable prices, 
and moderate long-term interest rates.”62  It may be true that 
any conflict created by the combination of macro- and microeco-
  
 59. As Goodhart and Schoenmaker explain:  
[T]he conflict of interest may arise between the monetary authorities, 
who wish for higher rates (e.g. to maintain an exchange rate peg, to 
bear down on inflation, or to reduce the pace of monetary growth), 
and the regulatory authorities who are frightened about the adverse 
effects such higher rates may have upon the bad debts, profitability, 
capital adequacy, and solvency of the banking system.  It is in this 
guise that the conflict has, indeed, from time to time occurred.  
Id. 
 60. For a recent study showing “that the separation of powers in regulation 
may act as a commitment against the threat of regulatory capture,” see Jean-
Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, Separation of Regulators Against Collu-
sive Behavior, 30 RAND J. ECON. 232 (1999). This provides further support for 
arguments in favor of regulatory competition.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 61. Di Noia and Di Giorgio conclude:   
We find that the inflation rate is considerably higher and more vola-
tile in countries where the central bank acts as a monopolist in bank-
ing supervision than in countries where this responsibility is as-
signed either to another agency or to more than one agency (possibly 
including the central bank). 
Di Noia & Di Giorgio, supra note 11, at 361. 
 62. 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2000). 
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nomic goals is less troublesome than the conflicts within the 
macroeconomic goals.63 
Support for combining central banking with bank supervision 
focuses on the positive synergies between the macroeconomic 
and microeconomic goals.  This is especially true in countries 
with bank-centered capital raising markets.64  Empirical re-
search suggests that confidential supervisory information can 
assist central banks in achieving monetary goals.65 Close rela-
tionships with banks will assist the central bank in anticipating 
the direction of the economy and in addressing financial crises.  
Intimate knowledge of banks will avoid inappropriate access to 
lender of last resort lending.  Bank supervision enables the cen-
tral bank to protect the payments system from the risk of con-
tagion.  
A recent U.S. study found that the Federal Reserve’s “mone-
tary policy responsibilities do alter its bank supervisory role . .  
. .  In particular, the stance of monetary policy, as captured by 
the federal funds rate, affects the supervisory behavior of the 
FED, but does not affect the behavior of the [FDIC and OCC].”66  
  
 63. In 1995, Goodhart and Schoenmaker observed regarding the experi-
ence of the Bank of England:  
In any case, the experience of the UK, an example of a country with a 
politically subservient central bank, suggests that such conflicts of in-
terest between regulatory and monetary objectives are an order of 
magnitude less important than conflicts between purely monetary ob-
jectives and political imperatives.  
Goodhart & Schoenmaker, Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision, supra 
note 56, at 546.   
 64. See Peek et al., supra note 56, at 651. 
 65. See id. (study on the use of confidential supervisory information by the 
Federal Reserve).  Importantly, this study notes that the Federal Reserve 
could obtain confidential supervisory information without actually being a 
bank supervisor.  Id. at 647.  However, the authors conclude that “‘hands-on’ 
supervisory experience may be necessary to identify the nuances of changes in 
bank health that contribute to the effective conduct of monetary policy.”  Id. at 
652. 
 66. Vasso P. Ioannidou, Does Monetary Policy Affect the Central Bank’s 
Role in Bank Supervision?, Tilburg University Center Discussion Paper 2002-
54, at 23 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  Ioannidou found 
that: 
[W]hen the FED increases the federal funds rate, it becomes less 
strict with respect to its bank supervisory role.  One explanation is 
that the FED compensates banks for the extra pressure it puts on 
them when it increases the funds rate, either because it views them 
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This finding does not necessarily favor the separation or the 
combination of the two functions.  It does, however, highlight 
the fact that the safety and soundness of banks is linked 
strongly to the performance of the overall economy.  All other 
things being equal, strength in monetary policy should lead to 
easier bank supervision. 
B. Concentration of Power 
Opposition to the combination of monetary and supervisory 
tasks is sometimes premised on an aversion to concentration of 
power.  Particularly in the U.S., the public remains suspicious 
of big government; this sentiment prevails in popular press cov-
erage of the Federal Reserve.67  In addition to the public’s suspi-
cions, concentration of power in a single agency can pose par-
ticular problems for the regulated.  Some of the normal checks 
against the abuse of regulatory power might be chilled when 
the regulatory function is combined with other power.  For ex-
ample, a bank might be reluctant to challenge regulatory ac-
tions (anything from proposed rulemaking to an enforcement 
action) for fear that the central bank might retaliate by impos-
ing higher reserves and limiting access to other services. 
When the central bank is the sole bank supervisor, the bene-
fits of regulatory competition68 are also lost.  This observation 
favors separation of the monetary and supervisory functions but 
also suggests that supervisory functions should be divided 
among multiple regulatory agencies.  In the U.S., three federal 
government agencies — the Federal Reserve, Office of the 
  
as its constituency or because it is concerned about the micro-
stability of the financial sector.   
Id.  The study relied on formal enforcement actions as a measurement of bank 
supervision. 
 67. Popular books about the Federal Reserve include: MURRAY N. 
ROTHBARD , THE CASE AGAINST THE FED (1994); EUSTACE MULLINS , THE SECRETS 
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE: THE LONDON CONNECTION (1983); WILLIAM GREIDER, 
SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE : HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE COUNTRY  
(1987). 
 68. For a discussion of regulatory competition in the context of financial 
institutions, see Edward J. Kane, Competitive Financial Regulation: An Inter-
national Perspective, in THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STABILITY 111 
(Richard Portes & Alexander K. Swoboda eds., 1987).  See also Kenneth E. 
Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977) (exploring the issue of domestic regulatory competition 
in detail). 
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Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation (“FDIC”) — and individual state agencies, 
share supervisory responsibility. 
Most observations regarding concentration of power are nega-
tive, but for some, particularly developing, countries, such con-
centration may prove beneficial.  In some countries, the stature 
of the central bank may be a necessary force behind a nascent 
supervisory regime.  Centralized power may be necessary to 
compel a change in the culture of regulation. 
With power comes responsibility.  A central bank that per-
forms poorly as a bank supervisor may suffer from lost credibil-
ity, which could seriously compromise its effectiveness in im-
plementing monetary policy.69  On the other hand, a central 
bank or other supervisor without clear regulatory responsibility 
can escape blame for poor performance. 
C. Independence and Other Institutional Considerations 
Recent support for central bank independence is strong and 
has translated into an international trend.70  The need for inde-
pendence in the implementation of monetary policy, however, 
does not necessarily commute to bank supervision.  On the one 
hand, bank supervisors might be more effective when they are 
insulated from political pressures.71  On the other hand, to the 
extent that bank supervision involves the activities and inter-
ests of individuals and firms, bank supervision should be sub-
ject to the kinds of checks and balances provided by judicial re-
view and political accountability.72 
  
 69. For an interesting discussion on why credibility is so important to cen-
tral bankers, see ALAN S. BLINDER, CENTRAL BANKING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE  
62–66 (1998). 
 70. See generally Michael Taylor, Central Bank Independence: The Policy 
Background, in BLACKSTONE ’S GUIDE TO THE BANK OF ENGLAND ACT 10 (1998); 
Geoffrey Miller, An Interest-group Theory of Central Bank Independence, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 433 (1998); BLINDER, supra note 69, at 53–76. 
 71. Lastra advocates for some degree of independence for bank supervisors 
and contends “that the US Savings and Loan Associations’ debacle might have 
been prevented or at least mitigated had non-political considerations more 
firmly prevailed in their supervision.”  ROSA MARIA LASTRA, CENTRAL BANKING 
AND BANKING REGULATION 55 (1996). 
 72. In fact, the Federal Reserve does not enjoy the same independence 
when acting as a bank supervisor as it does when implementing monetary 
policy.  For example, when the Federal Reserve initiates an enforcement ac-
tion against a bank or bank manager, the Federal Reserve is subject to the 
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Independence in monetary policy is achieved in several ways.  
One way is to ensure that the policymaker has freedom in the 
means for achieving goals proscribed by the legislator.  For ex-
ample, the Federal Reserve is mandated to pursue the goals of 
“maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term 
interest rates,”73 but the decisions of the Federal Open Market 
Committee on how to achieve those goals are practically irre-
versible.74  Another way to achieve independence is through in-
dependent funding.  For example, the Federal Reserve’s opera-
tions are funded not through appropriations, but through as-
sessment on the Reserve Banks.75   
Consideration of the source of funding is important to the 
question of separation of monetary policy and supervision.  
When a bank rescue is funded privately, the public’s desire for 
oversight is less than when a bank rescue is funded through the 
taxpayer.  In this regard, Charles Goodhart and Dirk Schoen-
maker observe: 
When the government has been providing the funds, either di-
rectly to rescue the banks, or indirectly via institutions estab-
lished to support the banking system, it is likely to wish to 
have a final oversight in the operation of the regulatory sys-
tem.  He who pays the piper calls the tune.  As the rescues are 
increasingly being financed by the tax-payer, so the responsi-
bility for supervision and regulation of the system — in order 
to avoid excessive calls on such tax-payers’ funding — has 
been passing more and more from central banks to separate 
agencies established under the aegis of the authorities.76 
  
same judicial review as the other federal banking agencies.  In bringing for-
mal enforcement proceedings such as cease and desist orders, civil money 
penalties, and removal and prohibition orders, the Federal Reserve is the 
“appropriate Federal banking agency” (“AFB”) for state member banks.  The 
OCC is the AFB for national banks; the FDIC for state nonmember banks; 
and the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) for savings institutions.  12 
U.S.C. § 1813(q) (1996).  Judicial review for enforcement actions brought by 
any of the AFBs is set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 1818(8)(D) (2000). 
 73. 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2000). 
 74. See BLINDER, supra note 69, at 55.  Taylor argues that the true source 
of the Federal Reserve’s independence is political.  See Taylor, supra note 70, 
at 14–15.   
 75. Schooner & Taylor, Convergence and Competition, supra note 44, at 
n.62. 
 76. Goodhart & Schoenmaker, Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision, 
supra note 56, at 543–44. 
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While the observations regarding funding of bailouts may jus-
tify the separation of macro and micro economic functions, other 
institutional observations suggest the benefits of a central 
bank’s involvement in supervision.  Recently, Charles Goodhart, 
Dirk Schoenmaker, and Paolo Dasgupta studied the skills of 
central bank supervisors versus non-central bank supervisors.77  
They found that “central banks employ more economists and 
fewer lawyers in their supervisory/financial stability wing than 
non-central bank supervisory agencies.”78  Staffing with rela-
tively more economists would seem to provide a better macro-
economic perspective on supervision.79 
V.  THE FSMA AND GLBA MODELS: ELEGANT ALTERNATIVES OR 
UNTESTED GUESSES? 
The U.K. and the U.S. clearly diverge with regard to the role 
of the central bank in supervision.80  The Bank of England, pre-
viously the primary supervisor of banks, lost its role entirely.  It 
retains some involvement in bank supervision, but not in a 
hands-on sense.  The Federal Reserve was and remains one of 
three primary federal bank supervisors.81  With the passage of 
the GLBA, the supervisory responsibilities of the Federal Re-
serve arguably increased and certainly did not diminish.  With 
regard to the question of the central bank’s role in supervision, 
both the British and American approaches could be described as 
elegant.  Britain scores high marks for its direct and consoli-
dated approach to supervision and for its bold move with regard 
to the Bank of England.  Quite simply, the FSA is the bank su-
pervisor and the Bank of England is not.  While some may wish 
to see the MoU82 as a hedge against a total severing of ties with 
the central bank, it remains clear that the prudential responsi-
bility rests with the FSA. 
  
 77. Charles Goodhart et al., The Skill Profile of Central Bankers and Su-
pervisors, 6 EUR. FIN. REV. 397 (2002). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  The authors note that when consumer protection is the regulatory 
goal, legal skills are more appropriate.  Id. 
 80. For a discussion of the reasons for such divergence, see Schooner & 
Taylor, U.K. and U.S. Responses, supra note 27. 
 81. For the purposes of discussion of the U.S. system of regulation, the 
term “bank” shall be used to refer to commercial banks and not savings asso-
ciations. 
 82. See supra Part III.B. 
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In contrast, the GLBA approach may prove exquisite for its 
opposite tack.  The complex division of supervision combined 
with Federal Reserve umbrella oversight potentially achieves a 
delicate balance of the pros and cons detailed in Part III.  This 
Part examines whether, given the arguments for and against 
separation, the American or British system represents a supe-
rior solution in the current debate on the role of central banks 
in bank supervision.  This Part will again consider the issues 
defined in Part IV:  (1) combination of macro and microeconomic 
goals; (2) concentration of power; and (3) independence and 
other institutional considerations. 
A. Combination of Macroeconomic and Microeconomic Goals 
In a sense, Britain’s approach to bank supervision provides 
the ultimate answer to the conflict between macro and micro-
economic goals.  Divorcing the Bank of England from direct su-
pervision preserves a single macroeconomic focus83 for the Bank 
and eliminates the conflict incentive. The question remains 
whether the Bank’s continued limited role in supervision pro-
vides the Bank with sufficient tools to promote the stability of 
the financial system.84  While few would quarrel with the ap-
propriateness of the Bank’s continued involvement in safety 
and soundness issues, the question remains whether, particu-
larly in a crisis, this involvement will give the Bank sufficient 
competence with regard to individual financial institutions to 
do its job. 
Given the dichotomous approaches, one might conclude that 
the Federal Reserve’s role in supervision would leave it prey to 
conflicts, yet, at the same time, provide the synergistic benefits 
of close supervision of individual institutions.  The reality is far 
more complex.   
The Federal Reserve lacks the single focus granted to the 
Bank of England.  The Federal Reserve is tasked with both 
monetary policy and bank supervision, and its role as a bank 
supervisor is further complicated by the fact that supervisory 
responsibility in the U.S. is dispersed among several regulators.  
  
 83. Of course, the same cannot be said for the FSA.  The FSA as an inte-
grated supervisor is responsible for implementing diverse legal regimes, i.e., 
safety and soundness versus consumer protection. 
 84. This is one of the Bank’s three core purposes.  See supra Part III.B. 
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The Federal Reserve is the primary supervisor for state-
chartered member banks, but not for state-chartered non-
member or national banks.85  Of course, any bank that is part of 
a bank holding company or financial holding company is subject 
to Federal Reserve supervision, including examinations and 
reports.  Still, the clear expectation is that the Federal Reserve 
will rely on the work of the FDIC and OCC with regard to the 
banks they supervise.86  Under this scenario, the Federal Re-
serve is responsible for directly supervising 955 of the 8,005 
commercial banks.87  Those institutions hold $1,706,559 million 
of the $6,504,593 million total assets held by commercial banks.  
Of the 955 banks the Federal Reserve supervises, only 26 hold 
assets of $10 billion or more, and the other 929 have assets un-
der $1 billion. 
This means that the Federal Reserve is involved in the direct 
examination of many small banks.  These examinations are 
conducted by the Reserve Banks and thus are physically sepa-
rated from the policymakers in Washington, D.C.  The benefit is 
that policymakers in Washington are less likely to be influenced 
by the needs of individual banks, with which the field offices 
have the direct contact.  The downside is that policymakers may 
lack the intimate knowledge of the banks that the Federal Re-
serve supervises — keeping in mind that these are, for the most 
part, small banks. 
This brings the focus back to the Federal Reserve’s role as 
umbrella supervisor.  The Federal Reserve retains the legal au-
thority to supervise banks.  Under certain circumstances, the 
Federal Reserve can conduct back-up examinations and demand 
reports of any bank and any non-bank subsidiary of a bank 
holding company.88  In addition, the Federal Reserve conducts 
annual inspections of large bank holding companies.  It con-
ducted 1,212 such inspections (1,118 on site; 94 off site) in 
2001.89 
  
 85. 12 U.S.C. § 1813q (2000).  The FDIC is the primary federal regulator 
for state-chartered, non-member banks and the OCC is the primary federal 
regulator for national banks.  Id. 
 86. See supra Part III. 
 87. These numbers are as of March 31, 2002.  See FDIC Statistics on Bank-
ing, at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/statistics/sectionc.html.  
 88. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 89. 2001 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, supra note 28, at 144. 
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Unlike the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve bears direct 
responsibility for the safety and soundness of bank holding 
companies and financial holding companies,90 and thus has 
much greater incentive to exercise its secondary supervisory 
powers.  Perhaps this provides both the incentive and legal ac-
cess that will result in the Federal Reserve having sufficient 
intimacy of banks to achieve desired synergies.  Balanced 
against this is Congress’ clear intent for the Federal Reserve’s 
role in supervision to be derivative — thereby leaving an un-
clear picture as to whether the Federal Reserve’s role achieves 
an elegant balance of the evils of conflicts and the benefits of 
synergies. 
Despite Congress’ somewhat contradictory “give with one 
hand and take away with the other” approach to the Federal 
Reserve’s role as umbrella supervisor, it remains clear that the 
Federal Reserve retains greater formal supervisory authority 
with regard to prudential matters than does the Bank of Eng-
land.  Still, the practical effect of this difference remains to be 
seen.  The Bank of England had no formal authority for bank 
supervision until 1979.  Before and after that time, the Bank 
often used an informal style of supervision that stands in con-
trast to the more formal, legalistic style employed in the U.S.91  
Therefore, while the Bank of England has lost its formal au-
thority to supervise banks, it may continue to exercise a signifi-
cant level of informal control, drawing its role in supervision a 
bit closer to the formal role of the Federal Reserve.  This is apt 
to be true in the short term, i.e., when many of the current FSA 
staff are former Bank of England employees.  Over time, as this 
personnel connection dissipates, there may be less opportunity 
for informal influence by the Bank.  
B. Concentration of Power 
While the FSMA concentrates supervisory power in a single 
agency, it does not consolidate that supervisory power with the 
monetary authority.  This is a consistent international experi-
ence.  As discussed in Part I, among OECD countries, only Ire-
  
 90. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  
 91. See generally, Schooner & Taylor, Convergence and Competition, supra 
note 44, at 621 (discussing the British style of moral suasion versus the formal 
style of supervision in the U.S.).  
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land has an integrated regulator that is also the central bank.  
This is also consistent with the current approach in euro-area 
countries.  While monetary authority has been consolidated at 
the ECB, bank supervision has not.92  It is possible that bank 
supervision may eventually be consolidated into a central au-
thority in Europe.93  It seems unlikely, however, that such 
power will be vested in the European Central Bank given inter-
national trends.   
The U.S. remains distant from the international trend toward 
integrated supervision.  Banking, securities, and insurance 
regulators remain separate.  Moreover, even within each of 
these traditional regimes, there are multiple regulators, i.e., 
multiple bank regulators, multiple securities regulators, and 
multiple insurance regulators.  The GLBA retains the balkan-
ized regulatory regime that has been a distinguishing mark of 
the U.S. system since the advent of the dual banking system.  If 
there are advantages to this system, they lie in the potential 
benefits of regulatory competition.  The disadvantages lurk in 
costly overlap and less than clear accountability.  Moreover, it is 
important to highlight the fact that the U.S. has no integrated 
supervisor.  The Federal Reserve’s umbrella authority differs 
from the type of integrated supervision that has captured inter-
national attention.  Such umbrella authority is prudential and 
only applies to the safety and soundness of banks, and not, for 
example, insurance companies.  Therefore, the U.S. system does 
not capture the benefits, if any exist, of an integrated system of 
financial regulation. 
While the GLBA avoids creating what might be seen as ex-
cessive concentration of power in an already very powerful Fed-
eral Reserve, it also disperses power in a way that allows ac-
countability to be evaded in a crisis.  In other words, if the Fed-
eral Reserve misreads or misreacts in the next crisis of banking 
industry, it is quite possible that it could shift the blame to the 
primary bank regulators and other functional regulators, de-
spite the Federal Reserve’s role as umbrella supervisor.94 
  
 92. See supra Part III. 
 93. For discussion of the potential alternatives for European financial su-
pervision, see Jeroen Kremers et al., supra note 20. 
 94. Of course, the converse is also true, i.e., functional regulators could 
attempt to shift blame to the Federal Reserve, claiming that the Federal Re-
serve failed in its capacity as umbrella supervisor.  
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C.  Independence and Other Institutional Considerations 
Recent U.S. history confirms the responsibility of taxpayers 
for financial institution failures.  The savings and loan crisis of 
the 1980s cost taxpayers $132.1 billion.95  The extensive nature 
of deposit insurance in the U.S. led to an extensive role for the 
FDIC in bank supervision.96   This reality is unlikely to change, 
especially given recent legislative efforts to increase deposit in-
surance coverage.97 
With the extensive and necessary involvement of the FDIC in 
bank supervision in the U.S.,98 one can question the necessity of 
the Federal Reserve’s involvement (or the OCC’s involvement 
for that matter) in direct bank supervision.  If the FDIC is ulti-
mately financially responsible for bank failures, then the FDIC, 
and not other agencies, seems the most logical situs for bank 
supervision.99 
Deposit insurance coverage is not nearly as extensive in Brit-
ain100 and thus may not justify extensive involvement of the in-
surer in bank supervision.  Moreover, the Bank of England’s — 
and other central banks’ — ability and willingness to coordinate 
and fund bank rescues may have diminished.101  Again, this 
supports the separation of functions in Britain. 
  
 95. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION , 1 HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES: 
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 39 (1997). 
 96. That is not to say that the Federal Reserve has not also been finan-
cially involved in bank rescues.  For example, the Federal Reserve provided 
liquidity support to Continental Illinois Bank (1984), Bank of New York 
(1985), and Bank of England (1991).  See Goodhart & Schoenmaker, Institu-
tional Separation, supra note 56, at 435–37.   
 97. The House of Representatives recently passed a bill that would in-
crease the already extensive deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to 
$130,000.  The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2002, H.R. 3717, 
107th Cong. § 3(a) (2002). 
 98. The FDIC has the authority to examine all banks holding FDIC-
insured deposits and has the authority to bring enforcement actions against 
all such banks.  The FDIC can also, under certain circumstances, provide open 
bank assistance.  See generally The Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 
(1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 99. For further discussion on this point, see Heidi Mandanis Schooner, 
Regulating Risk Not Function, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 441, 485 (1998). 
 100. The Financial Services Compensation Scheme compensates for the first 
£2,000 in deposits and then 90% of the next £33,000 in deposits.  See FSCS, 
Compensation Limits, at http://www.fscs.org.uk/about_us/compensation_ 
limits/ (last visited March 5, 2003). 
 101. Goodhart and Schoenmaker conclude:  
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Notwithstanding the above, a central bank’s interest in sys-
temic failures implicates its involvement, at some level, in bank 
supervision.  This brings the discussion back to the question of 
whether a central bank’s indirect involvement, like that of the 
Bank of England or the Federal Reserve’s umbrella authority, is 
sufficient in a time of crisis.102 
Finally, fundamental differences in the style of regulation in 
the U.S. and the U.K. may also affect the question of separa-
tion.  Historically, the U.S. has relied on an increasingly formal 
style of bank regulation, under which specific statutory con-
trols, e.g., capital regulations and prompt corrective action, are 
the means of supervision.  While the U.K.’s system of regulation 
has also become increasingly formal, it remains less reliant on 
specific statutory provisions and more on agency discretion.103  
These differences may implicate different skills on the part of 
the supervisory staff.  It may be the case that the U.S. system of 
bank supervision is implemented effectively by the legal staffs 
that are typically employed when bank supervision is separate 
from the central bank.104  On the other hand, a system that re-
lies on a more informal system of control may require the skills 
of economists, such as those on the staffs of a central bank.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The GLBA might be justified as a complex but elegant solu-
tion to the many advantages and disadvantages of combining 
  
But central banks are tending to retreat from their previous primary 
role [in bank rescues] for two related reasons.  First the banking sys-
tem is becoming less clearly defined, fuzzier; consequently it is more 
difficult to persuade the members of the banking club to agree to co-
operate in financing rescues.  So, the second reason is that the central 
bank is less able to organize co-operation on a self-regulatory basis.  
There is more need to turn to the Government both for statutory 
measures, and for ultimate financial support.  This latter means that 
the regulatory/supervisory function is tending to shift away from cen-
tral bank control to an independent body more directly under political 
control.   
Goodhart & Schoenmaker, Institutional Separation, supra note 56, at 384.   
 102. See supra Part IV.A. 
 103. For a full discussion of these differences in style, see Schooner & Tay-
lor, Convergence and Competition, supra note 44, at 647. 
 104. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
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macro- and microeconomic goals.105  Through its umbrella au-
thority, the Federal Reserve has access to bank confidential in-
formation that could improve its macroeconomic performance.  
Yet, it remains unclear whether Congress’ affinity for functional 
regulation means that the Federal Reserve will be rendered 
somewhat detached and therefore unable to take advantage of 
the synergies available when monetary policy and bank super-
visory functions are combined.   
The Federal Reserve’s continued role as primary supervisor of 
state member banks lacks justification.  If the Federal Reserve 
is to remain one of the primary bank supervisors, it would make 
more sense for the Federal Reserve to be responsible for exami-
nation of the largest banks, for which issues of systemic stabil-
ity are salient.106  Alternatively, given the FDIC’s extensive in-
volvement in bank supervision, one might question the neces-
sity of any central bank involvement in direct supervision. 
In the absence of proven success of integrated supervisors,107 
it is doubtful that the U.S. will adopt an integrated model.  One 
of the reasons is that it appears that a precondition to the inte-
grated model is the separation of the central bank from the in-
tegrated supervisor.108  The stature of the Federal Reserve, 
while not completely unshakable, is very secure.  Therefore, as 
a practical matter, it is unlikely that the Federal Reserve will 
lose bank supervisory authority to another agency — unless it 
wants to.109 
Of course, the fate of the Bank of England’s remaining lim-
ited role as bank supervisor is probably less a function of the 
success or failure of the FSA and more a product of the future of 
  
 105. Of course, the fact that GLBA might be justified on these grounds does 
not equate to an explanation of the passage of the statute.  More likely, the 
statute was enacted as a result of various special interest group pressures 
aimed at retaining or increasing their market share. 
 106. For example, the Federal Reserve’s role as direct bank supervisor could 
be reserved for the five to ten largest institutions.  While this author is not 
advocating this change, it seems to make more sense than the current division 
of supervisory responsibility.   
 107. For discussion of the initial success or failure of the single regulator, 
see Costs and Benefits of the Single Regulator, 6 FI N. REGULATOR 6 (2001). 
 108. See supra Part II. 
 109. It is interesting to note that one of the possible explanations for the 
Bank of England’s loss of bank supervisory authority was its relative ambiva-
lence to that role.  See Schooner & Taylor, Convergence and Competition, su-
pra note 44, at 635, 638.  
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bank supervision in Europe.  In other words, whether or not the 
integrated model proves successful, the implementation of that 
model by European countries on a national level may eventually 
cede to development of a federal regulator.  It is even possible 
that a dual banking system, not unlike that in the U.S., may 
emerge as a possible scenario in Europe.  
